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Abstract
This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on health-
care demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz’s approach assumes
equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Re-
laxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance
and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simulta-
neously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the
relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce
healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may
lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the
potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the
degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be
uninsured and still consume healthcare.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the current debate over health system reform by assessing the impact of
insurance on the demand for healthcare, using an insurance model with two types of individuals
(high-risk and low-risk). In contrast to the classic model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
we introduce a gap between the monetary evaluation of the discomfort caused by the illness
and the price of healthcare. We focus on both the adverse eﬀects on access to healthcare and
the structure of the health insurance system: compulsory versus voluntary, and private versus
public.
We define discomfort as the monetary evaluation of the individual’s suﬀering, and
price as the cost of treatment. The severity of discomfort may not imply costly treatment and
vice versa. An individual who suﬀers from a disease with serious consequences may find that
the health discomfort costs a great deal relative to the price of treatment. Conversely, some
harmless health problems nevertheless require high levels of medical expenditure, in which case
an individual may prefer to suﬀer the discomfort. This distinction makes clear that there are two
trade-oﬀs: i) choosing whether to be insured; and ii) in the event of disease, choosing to treat
the disease or not, whatever the choice made on the insurance market. As a direct consequence,
the probability of consuming medical care may diﬀer from the probability of suﬀering from an
illness, even with a competitive insurance market. Our model highlights the relation between the
demand for healthcare and the demand for insurance. This has not previously been analyzed,
to our knowledge.
In our examination of the eﬀect of insurance type on healthcare demand, we focus
on three concepts: perceived price, distortion and willingness to pay. Without insurance, the
perceived price corresponds to the actual price of healthcare; insurance will then aﬀect this
perceived price, leading to distortions of the healthcare market. The perception of price coincides
with the universal notion of out-of-pocket costs under the compulsory scheme. However, it may
diﬀer from out-of-pocket costs when insurance is voluntary. We find, as Santerre and Vernon
(2005) do,1 that the agent’s healthcare demand falls with perceived price. We also show that the
individual perceived price is higher under voluntary than compulsory insurance. The distortion
of the healthcare market is measured by the diﬀerence between i) the actual healthcare price,
which is exogenous, and ii) the individual perceived price which depends on the insurance system.
The willingness to pay is the maximum amount of money which an individual is prepared to
spend on an item of healthcare. The individual perceived price varies with the insurance scheme,
and so do distortion and the willingness to pay.
We find that the distinction between the monetary evaluation of discomfort and health-
care price brings about four main results. First, only the presence of insurance allows healthcare
to be sold at a price higher than the value of the discomfort. Without insurance, healthcare
is sold until the actual price equals the value of the discomfort. Therefore, our model clearly
1Without modeling the insurance market, Santerre and Vernon (2005) consider the relationship between health-
care demand and individual out-of-pocket prices. We extend their approach by distinguishing between the indi-
vidual’s perceived price and their out-of-pocket price.
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reveals distortions of the healthcare market, induced by the presence of insurance. Second, we
find a counter-intuitive result under imperfect information. Adverse selection may have a nega-
tive eﬀect on willingness to pay, hence healthcare may be sold at a lower price under imperfect
information. Third, we highlight potential non-participation, despite the competitive insurance
market. This non-participation is observed empirically. A similar result has previously been
shown by Dahlby (1981) and Hansen and Keiding (2002). These authors compared well-being
between compulsory and voluntary insurance markets in the presence of adverse selection.2 Our
model has the advantage of making less restrictive assumptions. We show that both high-risk
and low-risk individuals, or just one of the two types, may be excluded from the insurance
market under both perfect and imperfect information. Last, individuals may participate in the
healthcare market even though excluded from the insurance market. This result specifically
comes about for low-risk individuals under public voluntary insurance.
In addition, we show that the voluntary scheme Pareto dominates the compulsory
scheme in the private regime, whereas this is no longer the case in the public regime.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out our two-risk-type model relative to
the classic model and discusses a preliminary result: the probability of healthcare consumption
may be diﬀerent from the probability of illness. In Section 3, we define perception of healthcare
price, healthcare market distortion and willingness to pay. The two following sections then
analyze the model according to the way in which the insurance system is organized (compulsory
versus voluntary). Section 4 deals with private insurance and Section 5 with public insurance.
In these two sections we also discuss the eﬀect of optimal insurance contracts (derived in the
Appendices) on the equilibrium price of healthcare. Section 6 summarizes and reinterprets our
findings in terms of the relative power of insurers and healthcare suppliers in healthcare price
negotiations.
2 Approach and notation
2.1 Distinction between discomfort and treatment
In Rothschild and Stiglitz standard model of insurance, the monetary evaluation of the dis-
comfort due to the damage is exactly the price paid to repair this damage. Our approach
distinguishes between this monetary evaluation of the discomfort, called D, and the price paid
to repair this damage, P, whereas in the standard model, these are identical, and denoted P .
The diﬀerence between D and P may be positive or negative in our model. Our approach is
illustrated by many examples. Our approach can be illustrated by many diﬀerent examples. For
instance, the repair cost of a scrape on a car’s bodywork (P ) might be considered as way too
high compared to the associated discomfort (D). On the contrary, many illnesses can be fatal
if not treated with penicillin, and the cost of the latter is negligible compared to the potential
2Dahlby assumes the level of insurance to be fixed and exogenous, so that insurers choose only the amount
of the premium. Hansen and Keiding (2002) assume the existence of a pooling contract in a private insurance
market (see also Danzon, 2002). In our model, we do less restrictive these assumptions. First, we consider both
the premium and coverage to be endogenous. Second, the non-participation result arises not only under the
pooling contract but also with separate contracts.
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discomfort. These two examples illustrate the gaps that may exist between the cost of repair
(P ) and the monetary evaluation of the discomfort (D).
In both approaches, P and D are assumed to be exogenous. Without loss of generality,
we assume that repairs allow the agent to totally compensate for the damage D.
Table 1 shows wealth in each loss state in the standard model and in our model.
Denoting the initial endowment by w0, an insured agent pays a premium of α and is covered at
rate x. She then receives a payout of xP for repairs after the damage in both models.
Wealth in loss state Standard model Our model
Without insurance w0 − P
(
w0 − P if repairs
w0 −D if no repairs
With insurance
(
w0 − α− P + xP if repairs
w0 − α− P if no repairs
(
w0 − α− P + xP if repairs
w0 − α−D if no repairs
(Table 1)
In our model, the wealth of an uninsured agent depends on the discomfort and the
repairs. Individual wealth in the loss state is (w0−D) without repairs3 and (w0−D−P +D) =
(w0 − P ) with repairs, while in the standard model her wealth is (w0 − P ) in both cases. By
distinguishing between D and P , we introduce a gap between the reservation utilities.4 These
diﬀerences in reservation utilities from the standard model have a considerable impact on the
demand for treatment. The relation between insurance market organization and the demand for
treatment is studied in detail in Sections 4 and 5.
To illustrate our model, and make interpretation easier, we consider the context of
health insurance. Here, the monetary evaluation of the discomfort, i.e. the damage D, is caused
by an illness and the amount of repairs corresponds to P , the price of treatment. However,
our results apply beyond the field of health economics, to issues such as automobile insurance,
housing insurance, life insurance or even unemployment insurance in the labor market.
2.2 Probability of illness and probability of consumption
The price of treatment P is the price of healthcare. Thus, in the absence of insurance, treatment
costs an agent P . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the healthcare enables agents to
recover their initial level of health: treated agents suﬀer no monetary loss except P .5
We consider two types of agent. High-risk individuals, denoted H, have a higher prob-
ability pH of having the illness than do low-risk individuals, denoted L, who have an illness
probability pL. We denote by p the probability of consuming healthcare over the entire pop-
ulation (insured or not). This depends on pi (for i = H,L), the probability of consuming for
3 In this case, the agent suﬀers the discomfort.
4This model has some similarities with models of fraud, where there is a gap between the actual and the
claimed amount of repairs. However in these models, the monetary evaluation of the discomfort equals the cost
of repairs.
5A positive monetary loss from illness could be introduced in this model without loss of generality. Moreover,
we propose a static model. However, an extension with many periods using dynamic modelisation (see e.g. Dionne,
1983) could also be envisaged.
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type i. We will show that pi will take the value of either 0 or pi (i = H,L), depending on the
insurance system. We can write
p =
NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL
with Ni being the number of type i’s in the population

X
i=H,L
Ni = N

 and Ni
N
the proportion
of type i’s in the population (i ∈ {H,L}).
The distinction between the probability of consumption and the probability of illness
(damage), specific to our model, is crucial in the further analysis of the comparison between
voluntary and compulsory schemes, and private and public systems of health insurance.
2.3 Individual preferences and isoprofit curves
The reservation expected utility of type i, i.e. without insurance, is:
Vi(E) = piU(w0 −min {D,P}) + (1− pi)U(w0)
with E = (w0, w0 − min{D,P}) being the point of initial endowment. E is also called the
point of no-insurance. In what follows, we distinguish ED = (w0, w0 − D) the point of no-
insurance without treatment from EP = (w0, w0−P ) the point of no-insurance with healthcare.
By introducing min {D,P} into reservation expected utility, we take into account the agent’s
possibility of purchasing care (at price P ) in the case of illness, even if he is not insured. As
usual, U is a vNM utility function, increasing and concave in wealth.
Any individual may take out a contract C = (α, x), which specifies the premium α paid
to the insurer and the payout xP received by the insured in case of illness (with x ∈ [0, 1] being
the level of coverage). The expected utility of agent i insured by a contract (αi, xi) is:
Vi(αi, xi) = pimax{U(w0 − αi − P + xiP );U(w0 − αi −min {D,P})}+ (1− pi)U(w0 − αi).
In a voluntary system, an individual i will choose the contract (αi, xi) over no-insurance
if Vi(αi, xi) ≥ Vi(0, 0). It is obvious that no rational agent would choose to take out a contract
whose coverage would not be used in the loss state.
Finally the expected profit earned by an insurer from type i (i = H,L) is
πi(αi, xi) = Ni(αi − pixiP )
Note that profit depends on pi, the probability of consuming, which may diﬀer from pi, the
probability of illness.
Insurance plays a crucial role in the healthcare market. The agent’s participation in
the insurance market “distorts” his perception of the price of healthcare. In the next section, we
define what we mean by perception of healthcare price, individual distortion and critical price.
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3 Perception of healthcare price and the critical price
The initial endowment w0 is exogenous, but initial wealth is endogenous and depends on the
insurance scheme: a compulsory scheme implies that the agent is obliged to pay the premium, so
that the initial wealth of the agent is w0−αi whatever happens, while it is w0 under a voluntary
scheme (with a facultative insurance).
Definition of the agent’s price perception
An individual i obtains some level of expected utility from being covered by insurance
when he consumes healthcare at price P . For a given price P , the perception of price noted
Pei(P ) is the fictive treatment price paid by an uninsured individual which yields the same level
of expected utility as the individual enjoys when insured.
Algebraically,
piU(initial wealth −Pei(P ))+(1− pi)U(initial wealth) = EUi of an insured and consuming agent i
(1)
with initial wealth =
(
w0 in a voluntary scheme
w0 − αi in a compulsory scheme
, ∀i = H,L
The perceived price is a relative notion because it depends on initial wealth and not on
the initial endowment (see the expression on the left-hand side of Equation (1)). Price perception
is thus defined after the insurance premium has been paid (of course, for an uninsured agent
this premium is zero). This individual perception depends on the participation of the i− type.
This perceived price is represented in wealth space in health and in illness in Figure 1.
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
init. w.
init. w. – P
Vi for an insured and consuming agent i
Point corresponding
to (init. w. , init. w. – Pei )
wFi =init. w. – Pei
Point corresponding
to (init. w. , init. w. - P)
init. w.
Pei
Note: init. w. for initial wealth
Point corresponding
to (init. w. , init. w. - D)di
45°
Figure 1: Individual perception and distortion
The 45◦ line represents the line of certainty. The point (initial wealth, initial wealth−
P ) corresponds to the allocation of an individual who is not insured and who pays for his own
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treatment (at price P ) when ill; it also corresponds to the allocation of an insured individual
who does not ask for reimbursement of her treatment. This point, in the following figures, is
denoted EP in the voluntary case, and E0Pi in the compulsory case (E
0
Pi being the individual’s
initial endowment point minus the compulsory premium).
The point (initial wealth, initial wealth − D) corresponds to the allocation of an
individual who is not insured and who suﬀers her discomfort when ill; it also corresponds to the
allocation of an insured individual who prefers to suﬀer the discomfort when ill. In the following
figures this point is denoted ED in the voluntary case, and E0Di in the compulsory case (E
0
Di
being the individual’s initial endowment point minus the compulsory premium).
The value wFi is the Y-value of the intersection of the indiﬀerence curve of an insured
and consuming agent i and the vertical line joining (initial wealth, initial wealth − P ) with
(initial wealth, initial wealth−D). In other words, an insured and consuming agent i has her
initial wealth in state health and has wFi when ill. Therefore, the diﬀerence between the initial
wealth and wFi provides the diﬀerence in wealth corresponding to what we called the perceived
price. We have
Pei = initial wealth− wFi (2)
Therefore
wFi =
(
w0 − Pei in the voluntary scheme
w0 − αi − Pei in the compulsory scheme
∀i = H,L (3)
The presence of health insurance produces a level of utility which is the same as that
enjoyed by an uninsured individual who buys treatment at price Pei. Insurance therefore pro-
vides a level of utility corresponding to the diﬀerence curve Vi which passes through (initial
wealth, initial wealth − Pei).
Individual distortion
This distortion of the healthcare market di is measured as the diﬀerence between the
actual price (P ) and the individual perception (Pei), i.e.
di = P − Pei(P ) with Pei(P ) ∈ {PeL(P ), PeH(P )} (4)
Graphically, the distortion is represented by the distance between wFi and (initial wealth, initial
wealth− P ).
De facto, for an uninsured agent, the perception of price corresponds to the price P,
Pei(P ) = P for i = H,L (5)
Therefore distortion is trivially zero in this case. Thus, the distortion is due to the insurance
market because it depends on the participation and the level of coverage of the i− type.
Critical price or willingness-to-pay
We denote the critical price by PCi with i = H,L, also called the willingness to pay of
agent i. PCi is defined as the maximum price that an agent would pay for healthcare i.e. the
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price beyond which the agent refuses to consume. Agents consume until the perception of price
equals the monetary evaluation of discomfort. Therefore, willingness to pay PCi is defined by
Pei(P
Ci) = D for i = H,L (6)
Our definition of the willingness to pay extends Strohmenger and Wambach’s (2000) definition.
There willingness to pay is defined as the maximum price that an uninsured agent would pay
for healthcare, whereas we define it for any agent, insured or uninsured.
Trivially, the willingness to pay for an uninsured agent i from Equations (5) and (6), is
PCi = D
The uninsured agent will purchase healthcare if his utility under treatment is higher than his
utility without treatment in the loss state 6 i.e. whenever,
U(w0 − P )| {z }
Utility if no insurance and treatment
≥ U(w0 −D)| {z }
Utility if no insurance and no treatment
(7)
⇐⇒ P ≤ D (8)
Thus, as long as P ≤ D the demand for healthcare does not depend on the insurance market.
When P > D healthcare demand results only from insured agents, and the level of demand
depends on the insurance system. Any healthcare consumption results from insurance that
creates a market imperfection by allowing the sale of healthcare at a price higher than D.
Total demand depends on the probability of healthcare consumption of each typeH and
L. Since these probabilities themselves depend on whether insurance is compulsory or voluntary
and the market is public or private, we consider healthcare demand under four diﬀerent regimes.
Demand also depends on the level of information. With asymmetric information, all individuals
initially possess private information about their probability of suﬀering illness. The analytical
resolution of each program is presented in the Appendices.
In the following sections, we study the impact of relaxing the assumption P = D on
diﬀerent forms of health insurance and diﬀerent levels of information. Indeed, diﬀerent forms of
health insurance exist between and within OECD countries. In the Netherlands and Switzer-
land, the insurance contract is based on competition between private insurers. Nevertheless,
basic Swiss insurance is compulsory and insurers, who decide the premium, cannot discriminate
between their members. In France, health insurance is provided by a public monopoly with
respect to its compulsory element. The insurance premium is proportional to income. In the
United States, individuals under the age of 65 may take out a voluntary insurance contract with
a private insurer. A considerable7 fraction of the population is uninsured. A certain part of
6We assume that, conditionally on illness, if type i is indiﬀerent between treatment and no treatment he will
consume healthcare.
7“Approximately 15.6 percent of the American population were without health insurance coverage in 2003,
and the number of the uninsured is rising”. Source: http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml.
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the population is also insured via their firm.8 In this context individuals do not really have the
choice of a private insurer: were they to refuse health insurance via the company, the premium
required by any other private insurance company would be higher. This situation can be com-
pared to that of a monopoly private insurer. We therefore study diﬀerent types of insurance
schemes. By a private system, we mean competing insurers with the possibility of discriminating
between types. We call public insurance a system with a monopoly insurer where discrimina-
tion is not possible. We also compare voluntary to compulsory regimes. The implementation
of a compulsory regime in Quebec (Canada) seems to have had a positive impact on health-
care demand (Boyer and Léger, 2005). Berndt et alii (1996) empirically assess the eﬀect of 26
diﬀerent organizational dimensions of insurance in the US on patterns of care. Here, we show
theoretically that the insurance scheme has a significant impact on healthcare demand.
4 Private insurance
In the case of private insurance, we imagine the insurance market to be competitive. In the
absence of regulation, insurers discriminate between high risks and low risks by oﬀering separate
contracts with diﬀerent premia αi and levels of coverage xi.We compare the case of compulsory
insurance with that of voluntary insurance, first under full information and then under imperfect
information.
4.1 Compulsory insurance
With compulsory insurance, agents are obliged to participate in the insurance market. All agents
pay the premium αi even if they choose not to consume the healthcare. In our model, we show
that compulsory insurance is not always feasible, and if compulsory insurance is not feasible for
one risk group, then it is not feasible for the other either (due to adverse selection).
4.1.1 Benchmark case: perfect information
With symmetric information, the insurer can distinguish low risks from high risks. If P is less
than PCi , the critical price for type i, the insurer can propose a contract with full reimbursement
against the actuarial premium, as high risks cannot pretend to be low risks. Given that each
type i always pays the premium αi, competitive contracts under full information are derived
from Program Ia,
Max
αi,xi
pimax{U(w0 − αi − P + xiP );U(w0 − αi −min {D,P})}+ (1− pi)U(w0 − αi)
(Program Ia)
subject to Ni(αi − pixiP ) ≥ 0
8 “A third of firms in the U.S. did not oﬀer coverage in 2003. Two-thirds of uninsured workers in 2001 worked
for employers who did not oﬀer health benefits. Even if employees are oﬀered coverage on the job, they cannot
always aﬀord their portion of the premium. Employee spending for health insurance coverage (employee’s share
of family coverage and deductibles) has increased 126 percent between 2000 and 2004. Losing a job, or quitting
voluntarily, can mean losing aﬀordable coverage - not only for the worker but also for their entire family)”. Source:
http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml.
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for each type i ∈ {H,L}. Insurers thus trivially maximize the expected welfare of each type
subject to a non-negative expected profit constraint.
With P ≤ PCi ∀i = {H,L}, we have pi = pi, i.e. each type consumes healthcare and
Program Ia leads to an actuarial premium αPIi = piP against the guarantee of receiving P in
the case of illness9. Under full information, each type i thus receives his full insurance contract
called CPIi : x
PI
i = 1 (Fig. 2a and 2b).
In Figures 2a and 2b, w0 is the initial endowment, from which individuals pay the
insurance premium and the price of treatment. The private insurer can discriminate, and the
premia paid by the high and low risks are αPIH and α
PI
L respectively. Lines H and L are the two
zero-isoprofit lines; the tangent between these isoprofit lines and the indiﬀerence curves shows
the points of full insurance, where wealth is the same in the health and illness states. At ED,
an individual is without insurance and suﬀers the discomfort in case of illness, while at EP
the individual is again without insurance but pays for treatment when ill. At E0DL (E
0
DH
), an
insured low-risk (high-risk) individual has paid her premium but does not take up treatment,
and thus suﬀers the discomfort; at E0PL (E
0
PH
) the insured low-risk (high-risk) individual pays
for treatment herself and does not ask for reimbursement (and thus pays price P ).
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
w0
EP
H
L
Figure 2a: Compulsory and private insurance with perfect
information: CiPI always preferred to E’Di by any type i
CLPI
VHPI
VLPI
w0 –αHPI– D
w0 –αLPI– D
E’DH
E’DL
CHPI
w0 –αLPIw0 –αHPI
w0
ED
w0 – P
w0 – D
w0 –αHPI
w0 –αLPI
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
w0
EP
H
L
Figure 2b: Compulsory and private insurance with
perfect information: Perception Pei and distortion di
CLPI
VHPI
VLPI
ED
w0 –αHPI– P
w0 –αLPI– P
E’PH
E’PL
wFH
dH=P
dL=P
0 < dL = dH =P
0 =PeH = PeL < P
CHPI
w0 –αLPIw0 –αHPI
w0
wFL
Whatever the consumption decision, each type has to pay the compulsory premium
αPIi . Therefore, initial wealth is w0 − αPIi . A fully-insured agent who chooses to consume has
final wealth of w0 − αPIi in both states, whereas an insured agent who chooses not to consume
has final wealth in state illness w0 − αPIi −D which is less than w0 − αPIi , whatever the level
of discomfort D. As Figure 2a then illustrates, full insurance CPIi is then always preferred to
paying the obligatory premium without consuming healthcare, as shown by the points E0Di , by
any type i.
The individual perceptions and distortions are summarized in Lemma 1.
9When P ≤ PCi , we have pi = pi, i.e. each type consumes healthcare. The objective function is piU(w0 −
αi −P + xiP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 −αi). Given that the non-negative profit constraint is trivially binding, first order
conditions of Program Ia lead trivially to αi = piP , ∀i = {H,L}.
10
Lemma 1: When information is perfect, compulsory private insurance induces a
unique value of distortion equal to P and leads to a unique willingness to pay only limited
by w0
pi
.
Proof. Under a compulsory scheme, individual i’s perception of the price is defined
by Pei such that:
piU(w0 − αPIi − P + xPIi P ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αPIi ) = piU(w0 − α
PI
i − Pei| {z }
wFi
) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αPIi )
⇔ Pei = (1− xPIi )P = 0,∀i
It follows directly that distortion di is maximal, and equal to P. In Figure 2b, individual distor-
tion is measured by
di = wFi − (w0 − αPIi − P ).
The individual critical price, denoted PCi and defined by Pei(PCi) = D, is D1−xPIi
.
Even though the critical price PCi looks like it tends to infinity under the compulsory
scheme, PCi is actually bounded by the wealth of the agent under the no-loan assumption:
w0 − αPIi (P ) = 0. Thus the critical price is limited by w0pi .¥
4.1.2 Imperfect information
Introducing adverse selection into the model of private insurance has significant eﬀects on per-
ception and distortion, as high risks can now pretend to be low risks. The menu of actuarial
contracts with full insurance no longer pertains when the risk-type is not observable by insurers.
We therefore introduce incentive constraints in Program Ib to derive the competitive contracts
in this case. Insurers maximize the expected welfare of low risks, subject to the incentive con-
straints and the non-negative profit10 constraints:
max
αi,xi
pLmax{U(w0 − αL − P + xLP );U(w0 − αL −min {D,P})}+ (1− pL)U(w0 − αL)
subject to
pimax{U(w0 − αi − P + xiP );U(w0 − αi −min {D,P})}+ (1− pi)U(w0 − αi) ≥
pimax{U(w0 − αk − P + xkP );U(w0 − αk −min {D,P})}+ (1− pi)U(w0 − αk) i, k ∈ {H,L}, i 6= k
Ni(αi − pixiP ) ≥ 0 (Program Ib)
The form of the objective function results from imperfect information. The expected
welfare of low risks is maximized, as it is they who suﬀer from the negative externalities from
the high risks.
10As usual, competition à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1977) requires non-negative profits on each contract for an
equilibrium to exist. No contract with cross-subsidization is compatible with equilibrium, as any situation in which
some risks (here low risks) subsidize some others (high risks) produces the possibility for a rival company to earn
positive profits by attracting only low risks, via a contract with a lower premium against the promise of a reduced
coverage. Other authors (Crocker and Snow, 1984, and Neudeck and Podczeck, 1996) allow cross-subsidization,
but require governement intervention or alternative concepts of equilibrium as in Grossman (1979).
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From Appendix A, we find that for P ≤ PCi (with PCi being the critical price of agent
i ∈ {H,L}), the separate contract oﬀered to each type is the Rothschild and Stiglitz contract
(Fig. 3), (
x∗H = 1 and α
∗
H = pHP
x∗L < 1 and α
∗
L = x
∗
LpLP
For P > PCi , no-one is insured and no-one consumes the healthcare.
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
w0
EP
H
L
Figure 3: Compulsory and private insurance
with imperfect information
CH*
CL*
VH
VL
ED
w0 –αH – P
w0 –αL – P
E’PH
E’PL
wFH
wFL
dH
dL
0 < dL < dH =P
0 =PeH < PeL < P
Even though the separate contracts lead to two diﬀerent price perceptions, the following
Lemma shows that, under compulsory private insurance, the two critical prices are identical.
Lemma 2: Compulsory private insurance when information is imperfect induces dis-
tortion of healthcare market which is higher for high risks ( dH = P ) than for low risks ( dL =
xLP ), but produces a unique bounded willingness to pay PCi = PCL = D(1−xL) .
Proof.
• As above, the perception is defined as the treatment price for which the expected utility
of an insured agent is equal to that of an uninsured agent consuming healthcare. Here,
“not insured” means that the agent does not receive any reimbursement in case of illness
but, as insurance is compulsory, still pays the premium αi. Thus, Pei is defined by
piU(w0 − αi − P + xiP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αi) = piU(w0 − αi − Pei) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αi)
⇔ U(w0 − αi − P + xiP ) = U(w0 − αi − Pei) and so Pei (P ) = P (1− xi)
Hence, PeH = 0 and PeL (P ) = P (1− xL) < P. The individual distortion is equal to P
as under perfect information for the high risks, and equals xLP for the low risks (Fig. 3).
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• The critical price is defined such that the perception of the price corresponds to the
discomfort. So for low risks, PCL is given by:
PeL
¡
PCL
¢
= D⇔ PCL = D
(1− xL)
The equation PCL = D(1−xL) means that the L − types
0 critical price corresponds to the
out-of-pocket price. The L − types0 demand for healthcare will be positive as long as
P (1− xL) ≤ D. Hence for a price P > D(1−xL) , L − types pay the premium but do not
consume healthcare. The eﬀect of compulsory insurance is therefore ambiguous, as the
premium demanded is such that the out-of-pocket expense (P (1−xL)) is greater than the
discomfort.
For high risks, the definition of PCH is a priori more complex. As for low risks, H − type
agents choose between consuming or suﬀering the discomfort. In addition, they may be
tempted by the contract intended for low risks. This implies that the incentive constraint
of the H − type has to be taken into account in the definition of the critical price of
H− types in order to make them indiﬀerent between their own contract and the L− types0
contract.
When P > D(1−xL) , separate contracts are no longer Rothschild and Stiglitz contracts.
H − types will prefer the L− types0 contract whenever
pHU(w0−αH−P+xHP )+(1−pH)U(w0−αH) < pHU(w0−αL−D)+(1−pH)U(w0−αL)
(9)
On the right-hand side of (9), the compulsory premium paid by H− types is αL instead of
αH because each type chooses to pay the lowest premium αL when suﬀering the discomfort
is preferable to consuming healthcare.
Given that the incentive constraint is binding for the high risks, inequality (9) becomes
pHU(w0 − αL − P (1− xL)) + (1− pH)U(w0 − αL) < pHU(w0 − αL −D) + (1− pH)U(w0 − αL)
⇔ P > D
(1− xL)
⇒ PCH = D
(1− xL)
= PCL
Thus, the critical price of H − types depends only on the extent of insurance coverage of
L− types. ¥
To conclude, when P > D(1−xL) both types prefer not to consume healthcare. Whenever
a compulsory contract fails for L − types, it will fail for H − types as well. This result shows
that without regulation of the price of healthcare, the compulsory aspect of insurance may be
not relevant because even when insured, individuals do not consume healthcare.
Here, the perception of price11 is equivalent to the universal notion of out-of-pocket price
under the compulsory scheme. However, this is no longer true under the voluntary scheme, in
which perception may be diﬀerent from the out-of-pocket price.
11Fig. 3 illustrates PeL = P (1− xL) .
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4.2 Voluntary scheme
Here agents are not obliged to take out insurance. As under the compulsory scheme, an agent
who takes out insurance necessarily consumes the healthcare. Note that this no longer holds
under a public voluntary regime. In other words, consumption implies participation and vice
versa.
4.2.1 Benchmark case: perfect information
Voluntary insurance does not guarantee that both types will participate in the insurance market.
We thus explicitly consider the participation decision. In Program IIa, the choice of each type i
to take out an insurance contract market is captured by max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(αi, xi)}. The consumer
i thus chooses between the best contract oﬀered by competitive insurers and the “exit option”.
For each agent i ∈ {H,L}, the insurer proposes the contract given by,
Max
αi,xi
{max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(αi, xi)}} (Program IIa)
subject to Ni(αi − pixiP ) ≥ 0
Because the contracts are separate and the insurance scheme is voluntary, three situations are
possible:



Both types are insured, x∗i = 1 and α
∗
i = piP, ∀i (Fig. 4, ED1)
Only the low risks are insured but the high risks are not,
(
x∗L = 1 and α
∗
L = pLP
x∗H = 0 and α
∗
H = 0
(ED2)
No-one is insured, x∗i = 0 and α
∗
i = 0, ∀i (ED3)
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
w0
EP
H
L
Figure 4: Voluntary and private insurance with perfect information
CLPI
VHPI
VLPI
ED2
w0 – P
wFH
wFL
dH if ED1
dL if ED1
0 = dH < dL < P
0 < PeL < PeH = P
CHPI
w0
ED1
ED3
Individual i’s price perception is defined by Pei such that:
piU(w0 − αPIi − P + xPIi P ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αPIi ) = piU(w0 − Pei| {z }
wFi
) + (1− pi)U(w0) (10)
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which implies the following Lemma,
Lemma 3: Under perfect information, a voluntary private insurance system induces
distortions of healthcare market which are higher for L − types than for H − types, and low
risks are willing to pay more than high risks for healthcare.
Proof. When both types are insured, Eq. (10) becomes,
U(w0 − piP ) = piU (w0 − Pei) + (1− pi)U(w0)
⇔ U(w0 − piP )− U(w0) = pi [U (w0 − Pei)− U(w0)]
Moreover, pH > pL implies that U(w0 − pHP ) − U(w0) < U(w0 − pLP ) − U(w0) and we thus
have
pH [U (w0 − PeH)− U(w0)] < pL [U (w0 − PeL)− U(w0)]⇒ PeH > PeL
The distortion is thus higher for L− types than for H − types. When only one type is insured
it is the L − type. Therefore, their perception remains PeL while the perception of H − types
becomes P, so that dL > dH = 0.When no-one is insured, Pei = P and di = 0,∀i. Consequently,
the critical price of L− types is superior to that of H − types, so that high risks are the first to
leave the insurance market when there is an attractive exit option.¥
4.2.2 Imperfect information
Competitive contracts are derived from the maximization of the L − type’s welfare subject to
the incentive and non-negative profit constraints:
Max
αi,xi
{max{VL(0, 0);VL(αL, xL)}} (Program IIb)
s.t. max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(αi, xi)} ≥ max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(αk, xk)} i, k ∈ {H,L}, i 6= k
Ni(αi − pixiP ) ≥ 0 i ∈ {H,L}
Because contracts are separated and the insurance scheme is voluntary, the participa-
tion of one type in the insurance market does not depend on the participation of the other type
(as opposed to the compulsory case). Four subcases are analyzed in Appendix B relating to the
participation of each type i. From Appendix B, we have the following cases:



Both types are insured
(
x∗H = 1 and α
∗
H = pHP
x∗L < 1 and α
∗
L = x
∗
LpLP
Only the high risks are insured but not the low risks,
(
x∗H = 1 and α
∗
H = pHP
x∗L = 0 and α
∗
L = 0
No-one is insured, x∗i = 0 and α
∗
i = 0, ∀i
From optimal contracts, it follows that:
Lemma 4: Under voluntary private insurance and imperfect information, distortions
and willingnesses to pay depend on the type. The distortion induced by the insurance market is
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higher for H − types than for L− types, and H − types are willing to pay more than L− types
for healthcare.
Proof : The perception of healthcare price Pei for agent i is such that:
piU(w0−αi−P + xiP ) + (1− pi)U(w0−αi) = piU(w0−Pei) + (1− pi)U(w0) with αi = xipiP
and the critical price PCi for agent i depends only on their participation in the insurance market,
and is defined by Pei(PCi) = D:
piU(w0−αi−PCi+xiPCi)+(1−pi)U(w0−αi) = piU(w0−D)+(1−pi)U(w0) with αi = xipiPCi
The perception of price, and thus the critical price for each type, depends on the reimbursement
level determined by the program, which latter is at the Rothschild and Stiglitz level. In equilib-
rium, the two types do not have the same reimbursement level: the H− type is fully reimbursed
but L − types are only partially reimbursed. Therefore, the critical price for the L − type is
lower than that of the H − type.
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
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L
Figure 5: Imperfect information - voluntary and
private insurance when both types are insured
CH*
CL*
VH
VL
ED
w0 – P
wFH
wFL dHdL
0 < PeH < PeL < P
0 < dL < dH < P
In Figure 5, the healthcare price is such that the expected utility of uninsured agents
who suﬀer the discomfort is lower than that of the insured. Both types prefer to be insured and
consume healthcare. However, other situations may arise. Consider a price such that wealth
after suﬀering the discomfort is between wFL and wFH (Fig. 6). The L − type prefers not
to be insured and to suﬀer the discomfort, whereas the H − type has higher expected utility
from choosing insurance. There is thus a price interval in which only the H − type is insured.
In this case, the perception for the L − type becomes P , distortion is zero, and the critical
price is D. Last, for a certain level of discomfort, both types may have higher expected utility
from foregoing insurance (whenever VH(ED) > VH(α∗H , x
∗
H)). In this case, perceptions equal P,
distortions are trivially zero and the critical prices are D, whatever the type.¥
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Figure 6: Imperfect information: voluntary and
private insurance when only high risks are insured
CH*
CL*
VH
VL
ED
w0 –P
wFH
dH
0 = dL < dH < P
0 < PeH < PeL = P
We can now compare the situations of perfect and imperfect information. From Lem-
mata 1 and 3, we have,
Proposition 1: Imperfect information leads to a change in the ranking of individual
willingnesses to pay, via a reversal of individual perceptions and distortions. Moreover, adverse
selection may cause healthcare to be sold at a lower price.
Under perfect information, H−types leave the insurance market before L−types, while
the reverse holds under imperfect information. These results illustrate what is observed in health
insurance markets. After a certain age, to be insured, agents have to fill out a questionnaire
about their own health status and that of their relatives. Therefore, the level of information
for health insurers is comparable to that pertaining under perfect information. Our result thus
mirrors the empirical situation where individuals identified as high risk have diﬃculty in finding
insurance and some of them are excluded from the market: the price, and thus the premium, is
too high compared to the monetary evaluation of the discomfort12. This case may become more
likely with the advent of individual genetic information.
Not all health information can be obtained from questionnaires. For the same ques-
tionnaire health status, agents may still be heterogenous. The questionnaire is more ineﬃcient
in younger populations because the occurrence of acute diseases is lower in this population.
Insurers are again in a situation of asymmetric information. We observe empirically that being
outside the insurance market is preferred to insurance for young people in good health (because
of the level of the premium). This is what is predicted by our model with imperfect information,
where low-risk individuals may prefer to be uninsured.
12We consider here that the initial endowment level (and income) is identical for all agents. Thus, the exclusion
of one type is not due to monetary constraints.
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The second part of Proposition 1 is explained as follows. With partial coverage, the
incentive to quit the insurance market is greater than that under full coverage.13 Under perfect
information, both types are fully covered. Adverse selection leads the L − type to have only
partial coverage, and so lower willingness to pay. As a result, healthcare may be sold at a lower
price with imperfect information.
Note that under the compulsory system, agents cannot choose whether to take out
insurance: they are covered by the contract that the insurer oﬀers. Hence, whatever the con-
sumption decision, the L− type pays the premium α∗L and will consume as long as P ≤ D(1−xL) .
Under a voluntary system, the agent’s insurance choice depends on his expected utility. There
exist cases where, under voluntary insurance, the L− type prefers to be uninsured, while under
compulsory insurance he is obliged to be insured. Figure 3 displays such a possibility. This con-
figuration may occur for H − types as well. We show in Section 5 that under public insurance
there are equally some individuals who are (by definition) covered by compulsory insurance, but
who prefer not to be insured under a voluntary scheme.
5 Public insurance
By a public system, we mean both a monopoly insurance regime and no discrimination. A
unique premium α is paid by each individual to a public body. For example, “basic” French
health insurance can be viewed as being administered by a single public agency14. It also could
be a private insurer oﬀering a unique contract with non-discrimination such as that proposed
by a firm to its employees. The premium α and the level of coverage x are thus the same for
everyone.
For a given price P, the terms (α, x) of the optimal contract are derived from a pro-
gram in which the public insurer maximizes social welfare NHVH(α, x)+NLVL(α, x)15 under an
aggregate non-negative profits constraint
P
iNi(α− pixP ) ≥ 0.
In the public regime, as there is no discrimination, incentive constraints do not apply.
There is therefore no diﬀerence between the perfect and imperfect information cases. We consider
both voluntary and compulsory insurance. The pooling contract noted PC in Figures 7 and 8
is proposed.
13The diﬀerence between the expected utility from insurance and no insurance is greater under perfect than
imperfect information.
14The reality is a little more complex. To sum up, the majority of the population (the subpopulation of workers)
pays a compulsory premium (contingent on income), to a single public agency. However, discrimination based on
income may occur. In this paper, we assume that all agents have the same income.
15We assume that the insurer is utilitarian, so that the respective weights of H and L in the social welfare
function represent the proportions of H and L in the population.
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5.1 Compulsory insurance
Optimal public contracts are derived from Program III,
max
α,x
N [pmax{U(w0 − α−min {D,P});U(w0 − α− P + xP )}+ (1− p)U(w0 − α)]
(Program III)
s.t.
X
i
Ni(α− pixP ) ≥ 0
As shown in Appendix C, full-insurance pooling results, i.e. x∗ = 1 and α∗ = pP =
µ
NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL
¶
P
(see PC in Fig. 7). Individuals are obliged to take out full insurance, with a unique premium
α∗ being paid by each individual.
Wealth in 
state healthw0
H
PC
L
Figure 7: Compulsory and public insurance with full coverage
PC: Pooling contract
EP
VH
VL
w0 –α* – P
ED
w0 – α*
wF = w0 – α*
dL=dH=P
E’P
w0– P
dL=dH
PeH =PeL = 0
Wealth in 
state illness
From the characteristics of the pooling contract, we can derive the following results:
Lemma 5: Under compulsory public insurance, healthcare demand does not depend on
P , the healthcare price. Both types perceive the price as being zero, whatever the value of P .
The insurance market induces the same distortion whatever the type, equal to P , and a unique
willingness to pay, which is only bounded by w0
p
.
Proof. Each type of agent has to pay the premium α∗ and, in case of illness, each type
is fully reimbursed. Hence, in the health state, the wealth level of each type is w0 − α∗, and
in state illness each type chooses between consuming healthcare and being fully reimbursed (so
that wealth is w0 − α∗) or not consuming healthcare and suﬀering discomfort D (with wealth
of w0 −α∗−D). Whatever the level of P, each type will therefore prefer to consume healthcare
in the case of illness (w0 − α∗ > w0 − α∗ −D, ∀P ). De facto, the case where only one type i
consumes healthcare is not possible.
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We can also see that the perception of price Pei does not depend on the type. The
price Pei is defined by
pU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− p)U(w0 − α) = pU(w0 − α− Pei) + (1− p)U(w0 − α)
and so Pei (P ) = P (1− x)⇒ Pei (P ) = 0 and di = 0,∀i
and the critical price PCi is unique and defined by
Pei
¡
PCi
¢
= D⇔ PCi = D
1− x
which tends to infinity for x = 1. Only individual wealth limits the willingness to pay.¥
In a situation without insurance, the healthcare price P is bounded by D. Here, the
presence of compulsory public insurance produces an unbounded price.16 Whatever price the
insured agent faces, their perception of price is zero.
French social security is a monopoly insurer that does not discriminate. A large part
of healthcare is fully reimbursed. In a recent survey,17 64 % of respondents declared that they
perceive the healthcare price to be zero. Our model illustrates this empirical fact, and shows
the impact of price regulation on health expenditure. Insurance is imposed by public policy,
and the type of insurance leads to a perceived price of zero. The public regulator is responsible
for the level of health expenditure. The higher are healthcare prices relative to the monetary
evaluation of the discomfort, the more health expenditure can be called into question.
5.2 Voluntary insurance
Contrary to the private system, when type i chooses not to take out insurance, he may still
choose to consume healthcare.
Even if there is no discrimination in the public regime, the agent has the choice of
participating in the insurance market. However, contrary to the competitive system with vol-
untary insurance, only one contract (α, x) is proposed in the market, whatever the agent’s type.
Program IV may thus be written as
max
α,x
X
i
Ni{max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(α, x)}} (Program IV)
s.t.
X
i
Ni(α− pixP ) ≥ 0
There are four subcases, depending on which types take out insurance. From Appendix D, we
have


Both types are insured if x∗ 5 1 and α∗ = x∗
µ
NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL
¶
P
Only the high risks are insured but not the low risks if x∗ = 1 and α∗ = pHP
No-one is insured if x∗ = 0 and α∗ = 0
16Note that this infinite price does not mean that the types are insensitive to the price of healthcare: their
expected utility always decreases in P , whatever the level of x.
17Source: Enquête santé, INSEE 2002-2003.
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Both types participate - definition of L− types0 critical price Note that in a standard
insurance model where P = D, the solution of the program would lead to full insurance for both
types. Given that P can be diﬀerent from D, we obtain that both types either are fully insured
(PC in Fig. 8) or partially insured (PC’ in Fig. 8).
Why do insurers propose x∗ < 1? Consider the case in Figure 8 where x∗ = 1 in which
the L − type does not take out insurance. As we have P > D, the individual prefers not to
consume healthcare. The pooling contract then only concerns the H − type. Arrow 1 shows the
change in the H− type’s optimal contract depending on the participation of the L− type. Some
situations exist where the insurer can increase the expected utility of both types by proposing
a level of reimbursement x∗ < 1 (Arrows 2 and 3).
Wealth in 
state health
Wealth in 
state illness
w0
H
PC’
L
Figure 8: Voluntary and public insurance with full 
(PC) or partial (PC’) coverage
PC: Pooling contract
EP
VH
VL
ED
wFH= w0 – PeH
0 <  dL< dH < P
w0 – P
dH
1
CH*
VH
3
2
wFL= w0 –PeL
dL
0 < PeH < PeL < P
PC
There are two individual perceptions of healthcare price, Pei, associated with the pool-
ing contract. These are defined by
piU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − α) = piU(w0 − Pei) + (1− pi)U(w0)
with α = x
³
NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL
´
P and x 5 1
As with private insurance, the definition of the critical price under a voluntary scheme
depends on which types take out insurance. A pooling contract is proposed when both types
participate in the insurance market. The individual critical price is defined by,
Pei
¡
PCi
¢
= D⇒ PCL < PCH
Therefore, if L− type agents consume the healthcare, H− type agents will also necessarily do so.
In addition, if L− type agents participate, H − type agents also necessarily do i.e. the existence
of the pooling contract requires the L − types0 participation. Thus, the pooling contract only
exists for values of P such that P ≤ PCL . For P such that P > PCL , L−types do not participate
in the insurance market and do not consume.
Note that, even with P < PCL , participation in the insurance market is not guaranteed
(see below Proposition 2 for details).
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Only one type participates - definition of the H − types0 critical price It is possible
that only the H − type be insured. In this case the L− type obtains higher utility from being
uninsured (and undergoing the discomfort in case of illness) than from being insurance, and
does not take out insurance. De facto the contract for H − type agents corresponds to their
separate full-insurance contract C∗H .
For the L− types, as in the private system, price perception is P when uninsured and
distortion is zero. For H − types, from the definition of perception, we have
U(w0 − αH) = pHU(w0 − PeH) + (1− pH)U(w0) with αH = pHP
As a result, under a voluntary scheme, the perception of healthcare price, distortion and the
critical price do not depend on the public or private regime when only the H − type is insured
and are the same as those found under the private regime. Perceptions and distortions are shown
in Figure 6.
No-one participates In the extreme no-one chooses the pooling contract. Whatever the level
of reimbursement x 5 1, the L − type does not take out insurance. In addition, the expected
utility of the H−type insured by C∗H is lower than the expected utility of the uninsured H−type
who undergoes the discomfortD in case of illness. Both types then decide to suﬀer the discomfort
in the case of illness by remaining uninsured. In this case, the perception of both types is the
price P and distortion is zero.
From these three configurations, we have
Lemma 6: Under voluntary public insurance, the distortion induced by the insurance
market is higher for H − types than for L − types. Willingness to pay for L − types is lower
than that for H − types (under both perfect and imperfect information).
From Lemmata 5 and 6, we obtain that under a public regime, the perception of price
is zero under a compulsory scheme, whereas the perception is always strictly positive under a
voluntary scheme, even for individuals who are fully insured. Moreover, the perception of price
on the insurance market is higher for L− types than for H − types.
Our model treats simultaneously the demand for health care and the demand for in-
surance. The advantage of this approach is that we can make the following prediction.
Proposition 2: Under a voluntary public regime, the L− type may still consume even
though uninsured.
This configuration arises under the following conditions. First, the optimal pooling
contract (in terms of social welfare) is Pareto-dominated by the configuration where the H−type
is insured with a Rothschild and Stiglitz contract (C∗H) and the L− type is not insured. Second,
the monetary evaluation of the discomfort D is greater than the healthcare price P , so that
the expected utility of any uninsured agent is higher consuming the healthcare than suﬀering
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the discomfort.18 Therefore, under a voluntary public regime, consumption does not imply
participation.
We show that public price regulation does not need to be as strong as under a compul-
sory regime because both types have a non-zero perception of the healthcare price. However,
we show that the higher is the healthcare price P compared to the monetary evaluation of the
discomfort D, the lower is the level of reimbursement proposed by the insurer.
6 Insurance schemes and consequences
Distortion, willingness-to-pay and perception
Recall that distortion is defined as the diﬀerence between the actual price and the
perceived price. The individual perception corresponding to the discomfort defines the maximal
price, also called the willingness to pay. This maximal price level determining healthcare demand
depends on both the insurance decision and insurance market organization. Thus, for a given
price, the demands for healthcare and insurance depend on the form of the insurance scheme.
We summarize the results obtained above in Table 2.
Insurance system Price level Individual distortion Demand for
health care
Demand for
insurance
H  type L  type
Private Compulsory
P  D1xL   in PI
P  D1xL in AI
P P in PI
 P in AI
pHNH  pLNL N
P  PCH in PI
P  PAICL in AI
dH  P dL
PI  dH in PI
dLAI  dH in AI
pHNH  pLNL N
Private PCH  P  PPICL in PI 0 dLPI  P pLNL NL
Voluntary PAI
CL  P  PCH in AI dH  P 0 pHNH NH
P  PPICL in PI
P  PCH in AI
0 0 0 0
Public Compulsory P  D1xi   P P pHNH  pLNL N
P  D PpoolingCL 
dH  P (Pool.)
dH  P (R&S)
dL  dH (Pool.)
dL  0 (R&S)
pHNH  pLNL N (Pool.)
NH (R&S )
Public D  P  Ppool.CL dHpool.  P dLpool  dHpool. pHNH  pLNL N
Voluntary Ppool.
CL  P  PCH dH  P 0 pHNH NH
P  PCH 0 0 0 0
PI and AI stand for perfect information and asymmetric information, respectively.
For an agent i, PCi stands for willingness to pay and di stands for distortion
PCH and dH defined for a H-type’s contract under PI and AI
PAI
CL and dL
AI defined for a L-type’s R&S contract and AI
PPI
CL and dL
PI defined for a L-type’s contract under PI
Ppool.
CL , dL
pool. and dH
pool. defined for a pooling contract
18For instance, this arises with the following parameter values: pH = 0.5, pL = 0.2, w0 = 20, P = 5, D <
5, λH = 0.16 and U(w) = ln(w). More details are available on request.
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From Table 2, we derive the following propositions.
Proposition 3: Whatever the type of information, individual distortion is higher under
compulsory than voluntary schemes. In addition, whatever the insurance system, with imperfect
information, the distortion is higher for the H − type than for the L− type.
Proposition 4: Under a voluntary scheme, the willingness to pay for the H − type
does not depend on the regime (private or public). Moreover, individual willingness to pay is
always higher in compulsory than voluntary systems, except for the private regime with imperfect
information. In the latter case, this assertion holds only when pH1−xL > 1.
Intuitively, we expect that, for given healthcare demand, compulsory insurance will al-
low higher prices than voluntary insurance. Proposition 4 shows that, for pH1−xL ≤ 1, compulsory
insurance may actually produce lower prices than voluntary insurance. Proof of the second part
is presented in Appendix E.
Proposition 5: For all prices such that P ≤ D, healthcare is always consumed in the
case of illness and consumption does not depend on agent type. For P > D, healthcare is not
consumed by uninsured agents but is consumed by insured agents.
For an uninsured agent, the perception is the price of healthcare. As healthcare con-
sumption depends on both insurance market organization and the insurance decision, the insur-
ance system distorts the individual perception of price. Moreover, the distinction between price
and discomfort leads to unusual situations: under voluntary insurance, only one type or even
none of the types may actually consume healthcare, even under competition.
Price is exogenous, but healthcare demand depends on its level. Under compulsory
insurance19, healthcare demand is always maximal whatever the price of healthcare, while this
does not hold under voluntary insurance.
Intuitively, we expect that, for a given price, public insurance will lead to higher health-
care demand than that under private insurance. This is actually not always true, and no un-
ambiguous ranking is possible. For example, on the one hand (for P > PCLpooling in Table 2),
a pooling contract leads to demand which is lower than that with a separate contract; on the
other hand (for P > D1−xL ), the demand is zero for compulsory private insurance but maximal
for compulsory public insurance.
Demand and supply
In this paper, we simultaneously model the demands for health and insurance, and their
implications. To obtain the equilibrium healthcare price, we can imagine modeling healthcare
supply. However, this raises some separate issues. The supply of health care depends on i)
the degree of competition between suppliers (for instance, pharmaceutical laboratories), and
ii) policy regulation. The latter covers not only policy regarding healthcare organization (for
instance, a single public insurer or competition with private insurance) but also regulation with
19Here we focus on the situation in which compulsory insurance may be implemented.
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respect to healthcare price and healthcare reimbursement policy (i.e. preventative care, drugs,
doctors visits etc.). Suppliers’ bargaining power falls as healthcare regulation and competition
increases. The more the healthcare market is regulated, the greater is the public part of insurance
and the compulsory part of coverage; however, suppliers’ bargaining power will be greater when
there are only few suppliers. As such, a regulated competitive healthcare market oﬀers the
greatest bargaining power to a single insurer.
Including supply therefore requires a complicated model of three markets. We can
however look at monopoly healthcare supply without regulation, which allows us to analyze
a three-market model according to insurance type. A monopoly healthcare supplier has the
greatest bargaining power in a competitive insurance market. Such a supplier can impose the
healthcare price at its maximal level, i.e. at willingness to pay. Empirically, some Doctors
or Specialists can be considered as monopoly suppliers due to their reputation, the density
of suppliers in their area, and so on. Moreover, they may be not regulated, as in France.20
Another example is drugs which are protected by a patent, allowing pharmaceutical firms to
enjoy a temporary monopoly. However, willingness to pay may be multiple. With two individual
willingnesses to pay, only one is the equilibrium price.21 The supplier faces a trade-oﬀ (in terms
of profit) between supplying all of the demand at a price equal to the lowest willingness to pay,
and attracting only a subpopulation by fixing price at the highest willingness to pay. We have
shown that, in a voluntary scheme, such a trade-oﬀ occurs. Note that if the trade-oﬀ leads to
the exclusion of the L− types from the healthcare market, the healthcare price which prevails
is independent of the nature of the regime (private or public), and is equal to the willingness to
pay of the H − type (See Proposition 4).
From Proposition 4, the equilibrium price is higher in compulsory than in voluntary
systems, except for a private regime with imperfect information. From Table 2, a public system
may not lead to a higher equilibrium price than a private system. Last, from Proposition 1,
the equilibrium price is higher under perfect than imperfect information. Adverse selection may
therefore lead to lower market prices.
Insurance and welfare
Insurance has an impact not only on the perceived price of healthcare but also on
individual welfare.
Proposition 6: Under perfect and imperfect information, voluntary schemes Pareto-
dominate compulsory schemes in the private regime, whereas this is not the case in the public
regime.
Proof.
There are three possible situations in the private regime:
- both types are indiﬀerent between the two schemes,
20 In France, there are two groups of physicians, one of which is regulated (Secteur I) while the other is not
(Secteur II).
21 It holds with a n-type model.
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- one type22 prefers a voluntary system because he can then opt out of insurance, and
the other one is indiﬀerent
- both types prefer a voluntary system because they can then opt out of insurance.
In contrast, in the public regime, some situations exist where high risks are better oﬀ
under a compulsory scheme (x∗ = 1) than under a voluntary scheme (x∗ < 1) and low risks are
better oﬀ under a voluntary scheme than under a compulsory scheme (see Fig. 7).¥
7 Conclusion
One objective of this paper has been to explore the relation between insurance demand and
healthcare demand. In contrast with the classic model à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we
highlight the diﬀerence between the monetary evaluation of the discomfort caused by illness and
the price of medical care. We focused on the adverse eﬀects on access to healthcare and the
form of the health insurance system: compulsory versus voluntary, and private versus public.
Our results were presented in the context of health economics; however, there are a variety of
fields in which these results will hold.
Without insurance, the perceived price corresponds to the actual price, so that health-
care is always consumed until its price equals the value of discomfort. Only the presence of
insurance permits its consumption at a higher price. Insurance aﬀects the perceived price of
healthcare, distorting the price. The perception of price coincides with the out-of-pocket price
under the compulsory scheme. However, it may diﬀer from the universal notion of out-of-pocket,
as it here takes into account the probability that the individual takes out insurance. The per-
ceived price is lower under compulsory than voluntary schemes; therefore, distortion is higher
under a compulsory scheme. In terms of welfare, voluntary schemes Pareto-dominate compulsory
schemes in the private regime, whereas this ranking does not hold in the public regime.
Our results provide some theoretical foundations, which to our knowledge have not
been previously developed in insurance models, for two empirical phenomena: non-participation
in insurance for some risk groups, and/or exclusion from the healthcare market.
The distinction between price and discomfort may lead to a situation where only one
type consumes healthcare even under competition, i.e. the price for this type is superior to
his/her willingness to pay. This situation never exists in the classical competitive model of
Rothschild and Stiglitz, because price is at a level where all agents are willing to pay. Indeed,
for healthcare to be sold, its price has to be less than or equal to the willingness to pay. Under
the private regime, perfect information leads the willingness to pay of low risk individuals to be
higher than that of high risk individuals. The exit option is thus chosen at a higher price by
the low risk group than the high risk group. This situation reflects an observed fact in various
insurance markets. For instance, bad drivers or individuals with severe pathology have diﬃculty
in finding private insurance contracts except at high premia because their characteristics are
at least partially observable. This is reversed under asymmetric information: high-risk individ-
22The high-risk group under perfect information and the low-risk group under imperfect information.
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uals participate in the insurance market at a higher level of healthcare price than do low-risk
individuals. This exclusion of one group raises a public health issue.
The phenomenon of non-participation relies here on an argument which is diﬀerent from
the usual one of financial constraints: one group of individuals renounces insurance and treat-
ment when the price of treatment, and hence the premium, is high compared to the monetary
evaluation of the discomfort.
Surprisingly, adverse selection has a negative eﬀect on willingness to pay under certain
configurations. Thus, healthcare may be sold at a higher price under perfect than under im-
perfect information. Considering monopoly healthcare supply without regulation, willingness
to pay is the equilibrium price. We thus have that i) the equilibrium price may be lower in
compulsory than in voluntary systems for a private regime under imperfect information, and ii)
contrary to intuition, adverse selection may lead to lower prices.
In addition, under voluntary public insurance, one type may prefer to be uninsured
and consume the healthcare. This result mirrors the situation in the US (or European countries
for supplementary insurance coverage) where some individuals do not take out insurance but
participate in the healthcare market.
For simplicity, we have assumed only two risk types. Most of our results can be ex-
tended to N risk types. Moreover, we consider diﬀerent insurance schemes separately; we could
imagine a system where insured agents can choose complementary coverage in addition to their
compulsory insurance, as in Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) or Hoel and Iversen (2002).
These results shed some light on the current debate over the reform of health systems
world-wide, and particularly in OECD countries. They also provide a framework in which
to think about healthcare prices and their relation to the insurance system. However, health
status is a subjective notion, and the perception of health status can be manipulated by the
pharmaceutical industry, as in Moynihan et alii (2002), doctors and/or the regulator. Further
research in this context could consider the impact of these actors on the demand for healthcare
in the situation where discomfort may diﬀer from the price.
8 Appendix
A: The Private System with Compulsory Insurance
In order to characterize optimal contracts under compulsory insurance, we derive the
first-order conditions. The Lagrangian of Program Ib is:
L = pLmax{U(w0 − αL − P + xLP );U(w0 − αL −min{P ;D})}+ (1− pL)U(w0 − αL)
+Σi=H,Lδi[pimax{U(w0 − αi − P + xiP );U(w0 − αi −min{P ;D})}+ (1− pi)U(w0 − αi)
− pimax{U(w0 − αk − P + xkP );U(w0 − αk −min{P ;D})}+ (1− pi)U(w0 − αk)]
+Σi=H,LµiNi(αi − pixiP )
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with δi and µi being the multipliers associated with the incentive and profit constraints respec-
tively. It is trivial to show that any competitive regime implies that the non-negative profit
constraints are binding. Thus µi > 0 for each type i.
Insurance being compulsory, P ≤ PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L}, i.e. both types consume pi = pi
∀i ∈ {H,L}. The first-order conditions with respect to αi and xi yield Equations (1) to (4):
[−pL + δHpH − δLpL]U 0(w0 − αL − P + xLP )+
[δH(1− pH)− (δL + 1)(1− pL)]U 0(w0 − αL) + µLNL = 0 (1)
[−δHpH + δLpL]U 0(w0 − αH − P + xHP ) + [−δH(1− pH) + δL(1− pL)]U 0(w0 − αH) + µHNH = 0
(2)
[pL − δHpH + δLpL]U 0(w0 − αL − P + xLP ) = µLNLpL (3)
[δHpH − δLpL]U 0(w0 − αH − P + xHP ) = µHNHpH (4)
Four cases are possible, depending on which incentive constraints hold. It is easy to
show that only the high risks’ incentive constraint is binding, δH > 0 and δL = 0, so that optimal
contracts are Rothschild and Stiglitz contracts. Equations (2) and (4) imply x∗H = 1 and, from
the non-negative profit constraint, α∗H = pHP . Moreover, putting δL = 0 in Equations (2) and
(4) leads to
U 0(w0 − αL − P + xLP )
U 0(w0 − αL)
=
pL (1− pL)− δHpL(1− pH)
pL (1− pL)− δHpH (1− pL)
> 1
implying that x∗L < 1 and α
∗
L = x
∗
LpLP , since pL < pH .
Recall that the compulsory character of insurance implicitly requires that a strictly
positive premium (αi > 0 ∀i) be charged against the promise of positive coverage (xi > 0 ∀i).
Therefore, P > PCi for at least one i ∈ {H,L} implies that healthcare is no longer consumed
for both types. A regime of non-insurance prevails.
B: The Private System with Voluntary Insurance
In this regime, participation implies consumption and vice versa. Hence any uninsured
agent is located at ED. The Lagrangian of Program IIb is:
L = max{pLU(w0 −D) + (1− pL)U(w0); pLU(w0 − αL − P + xLP ) + (1− pL)U(w0 − αL)}
+Σi=H,Lδi[max{piU(w0 −D) + (1− pi)U(w0); piU(w0 − αi − P + xiP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αi)}
−max{piU(w0 −D) + (1− pi)U(w0); piU(w0 − αk − P + xkP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − αk)}]
+Σi=H,LµiNi(αi − pixiP )
There are four cases to be analyzed, depending on the consumption of each type i.
• 1. P ≤ PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L} i.e. both types consume healthcare pi = pi.
Each type consumes healthcare when participating in the insurance market. This
situation occurs when max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(αi, xi)} = Vi(αi, xi) for i ∈ {H,L}. Even if Program
IIb is diﬀerent from Program Ib, the first-order conditions after rearrangement are similar to
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those found in Appendix A, and the optimal contracts under voluntary insurance correspond to
Rothschild and Stiglitz contracts:
x∗H = 1, α
∗
H = pHP, x
∗
L < 1 and α
∗
L = x
∗
LpLP.
• 2. P > PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L} i.e. no-one consumes healthcare pi = 0
This case occurs when no-one is insured: max{Vi(0, 0);Vi(αi, xi)} = Vi(0, 0) for i ∈
{H,L}. In terms of price, this case can only occur when P > PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L}. This implies that
no-one consumes in case of illness. The optimal contracts are trivially: x∗i = 0 and α
∗
i = 0 ∀i ∈ {H,L} .
• 3. PCH < P ≤ PCL i.e. only low risks consume: pH = 0 and pL = pL.
Formally, max{VL(0, 0);VL(αL, xL)} = VL(αL, xL) and max{VH(0, 0);VH(αH , xH)} =
VH(0, 0). We show that this case, where only low risks participate in the insurance market, can
never arise. Indeed, if a contract (αL, xL) exists which is preferred to no insurance by low risks,
this contract will also necessarily be preferred to no insurance by high risks. More formally, we
prove that
VL(αL, xL) ≥ VL(0, 0) implies VH(αL, xL) ≥ VH(0, 0).
The first inequality is equivalent to
pL [U(w0 − αL − P + xLP )−max{U(w0 − P );U(w0 −D)}]+(1−pL) [U(w0 − αL)− U(w0)] ≥ 0.
Moreover, U(w0−αL)−U(w0) < 0 implies U(w0−αL−P+xLP )−max{U(w0−P );U(w0−D)} >
0 given that low risks take out insurance.
Furthermore, since pH > pL, the following inequality
pH [U(w0 − αL − P + xLP )−max{U(w0 − P );U(w0 −D)}]| {z }
>0
+(1−pH)[U(w0 − αL)− U(w0)]| {z }
<0
> 0
always holds. Thus, VH(αL, xL) ≥ VH(0, 0), such that there exists no contract which would be
preferred to no insurance by low risks and would not be preferred by high risks.
4. PCL < P ≤ PCH i.e. only high risks consume: pH = pH and pL = 0
This occurs whenmax{VH(0, 0);VH(αH , xH)} = VH(αH , xH) andmax{VL(0, 0);VL(αL, xL)} =
VL(0, 0). Then the first-order conditions relative to αH and xH imply, after rearrangement:·
(1− pH)(pHδH − pLδL)
pH
¸
U 0(w0 − αH − P + xHP ) + [δH + δL − pHδH − pLδL]U 0(w0 − αH) = 0
⇔ U
0(w0 − αH − P + xHP )
U 0(w0 − αH)
=
(pHδH − pHδL − p2HδH + pHpLδL)
(pHδH − pLδL − p2HδH + pHpLδL)
Moreover, if δL > 0, or in other words if the incentive constraint of low risks is binding, the two
types would be oﬀered the same contract. Clearly, a pooling contract would be incompatible
with the individual profit constraints. Thus L’s incentive constraint holds with strict inequal-
ity, implying δL = 0 and consequently
U 0(w0−αH−P+xHP )
U 0(w0−αH) = 1. In terms of the premium and
indemnity, we obtain
α∗H = pHP, x
∗
H = 1, α
∗
L = 0 and x
∗
L = 0 which means L-types leave the insurance mar-
ket and the healthcare market, while H-types consume and are fully reimbursed.
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C: The Public System with Compulsory Insurance
For a given price P, the Lagrangian of Program III is:
L = N [pmax{U(w0−α−P+xP );U(w0−α−min{D;P})}+(1−p)U(w0−α)]+µ
X
i
Ni(α−pixP )
Insurance being compulsory when P ≤ PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L}, both types consume the healthcare
i.e. pi = pi ∀i ∈ {H,L}. Formally,
max {U(w0 − α− P + xP );U(w0 − α−min{P ;D})} = U(w0 − α− P + xP )
and the first-order conditions relative to α and x are
−(NHpH +NLpL)U 0(w0 − α− P + xP )− (N −NHpH −NLpL)U 0(w0 − α) + µN = 0 (5)
(NHpH +NLpL)PU
0(w0 − α− P + xP ) = µ(NHpH +NLpL)P (6)
which yield
U 0(w0 − α− P + xP )
U 0(w0 − α)
= 1 i.e. x∗ = 1 and α∗ = (NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL)P
For the same reason as in Appendix A, P > PCi for at least one i ∈ {H,L} is not
compatible with compulsory insurance. A non-insurance regime results.
D: The Public System with Voluntary Insurance
The optimal contracts are derived from Program IV, which can be expanded as follows
Max
αi,xi
X
i
Nimax{piU(w0 −min{D;P}) + (1− pi)U(w0); piU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − α)}
s.t.
X
i
Ni(α− pixP ) ≥ 0
with µ being the multiplier associated with the aggregate profit constraint. There are four cases,
depending on which types consume healthcare. Note that under the assumption of voluntary
insurance it is possible that an uninsured agent still consume healthcare. Participation in the
insurance market thus implies healthcare consumption in the case of illness, but the inverse
implication does not hold.
• 1. P ≤ PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L}: both types consume healthcare pi = pi
a) Both types are insured
In order to maximize collective welfare, the public regulator can use the participation
constraint to ensure that low-risks prefer the pooling contract to no insurance. To take this
situation into account, we add the L’s participation constraint to the program, VL(α, x) ≥
VL(0, 0). The Lagrangian is therefore,
L =
X
i
Nimax{piU(w0 −min{D;P}) + (1− pi)U(w0); piU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− pi)U(w0 − α)}
+µ
X
i
Ni(α− pixP )
+δ[pLU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− pL)U(w0 − α)− pLU(w0 −min{D;P})− (1− pL)U(w0)]
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with δ ≥ 0, the multiplier associated with the participation constraint.
The first-order conditions are,
−(NHpH +NLpL)U 0(w0 − α− P + xP )− (N −NHpH −NLpL)U 0(w0 − α)
+µN − δpLU 0(w0 − α− P + xP )− δ(1− pL)U 0(w0 − α) = 0
(7)
(NHpH +NLpL)PU
0(w0 − α− P + xP )− µ(NHpH +NLpL)P + δpLU 0(w0 − α− P + xP )P = 0
(8)
From (8),
µ =
((NHpH +NLpL) + δpL)U
0(w0 − α− P + xP )
(NHpH +NLpL)
and with (7),
U 0(w0 − α)
U 0(w0 − α− P + xP )
=
((NHpH +NLpL) + δpL)(−1 + N(NHpH+NLpL))
(N − (NHpH +NLpL) + δ(1− pL))
⇔ U
0(w0 − α)
U 0(w0 − α− P + xP )
=
−(NHpH +NLpL) +N − δpL + δ
³
pLN
NHpH+NLpL
´
−(NHpH +NLpL) +N − δpL + δ
→When δ = 0 the right-hand side equals 1, so that x∗ = 1 and α∗ = (NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL)P .
→ when δ > 0, given that pLN < (NHpH+NLpL), if (N −NHpH −NLpL − δpL + δ) >
0 the right-hand side is less than 1, so that x∗ < 1 and α∗ = x(NH
N
pH +
NL
N
pL)P
b) No-one is insured: The case where both types consume and are not insured is not
possible because this situation is always dominated by the Rothschild and Stiglitz contract
oﬀered to the H type.
c) One type is insured:
¨ If the L− type is insured: It is trivial to show that any contract accepted by the
L− type is always accepted by the H − type, i.e. that
max{VL(0, 0), VL(α, x)} = VL(α, x) =⇒ max{VH(0, 0), VH(α, x)} = VH(α, x)
The case where only the L− type is insured does not occur.
¨ If only the H − type is insured we have
max{VH(0, 0), VH(α, x)} = VH(α, x) and max{VL(0, 0), VL(α, x)} = VL(0, 0)
This unusual case occurs only when P < D i.e. the healthcare is always purchased by each type
in the case of illness. The Lagrangian is
L = NH [pHU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− pH)U(w0 − α)]
+NL[pLU(w0 − P ) + (1− pL)U(w0)] + µNH(α− (pHx)P ) with x = xH and xL = 0
We thus obtain x∗ = 1 and α∗ = pHP . A numerical example is given in Section 5.2.
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• 2. P > PCi ∀i ∈ {H,L} i.e. no-one consumes the healthcare pi = 0. This implies
that both types are not insured so, α∗ = x∗ = 0.
• 3. PCH < P ≤ PCL i.e. only low risks consume: pH = 0 and pL = pL.
L-type insured impliesmax{VH(0, 0), VH(α, x)} = VH(0, 0) andmax{VL(0, 0), VL(α, x)} =
VL(α, x). This configuration would imply pL = pL and pH = 0. By a similar argument to that
above, no contract exists which would be preferred to no insurance by low risks and would not
be taken out by high risks.
L-type uninsured. This case implies that both types are uninsured. Thus, the consump-
tion decision does not depend on the type. We cannot therefore have L− types who consume
and not H− types.
4. PCL < P ≤ PCH i.e. only high risks consume: pH = pH and pL = 0
H-type insured. The Lagrangian is
L = NH [pHU(w0 − α− P + xP ) + (1− pH)U(w0 − α)]
+NL[pLU(w0 −D) + (1− pL)U(w0)] + µNH(α− pHxP )
and the first-order conditions are:
−NHpHU 0(w0 − α− P + xP )−NH(1− pH)U 0(w0 − α) + µNH = 0 (9)
NHpHPU
0(w0 − α− P + xP )− µNHpHP = 0 (10)
which imply that x∗ = 1 and α∗ = pHP .
H−type uninsured. This case implies that both types are uninsured. The consumption
decision does not depend on the type. Therefore, we cannot have H− types who consume and
L− types who do not.
E: Proof of Proposition 4
We distinguish PCiv the critical price under a voluntary scheme from P
Ci
c the critical
price under a compulsory scheme.
• For both types in a public regime, regardless of the level of information:
In a compulsory system, the price is bounded by the initial endowment of the agent. In
the public voluntary system, it is bounded by PCLv for the L−type and by PCHv for the H−type.
Therefore, the critical price is always higher in a compulsory than in a voluntary system.
• For both types in a private regime under perfect information: the same argument as for
the public regime holds.
• For both types in a private regime under imperfect information:
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The situation is more complicated. (a) For the L− type, the price is bounded by D1−xL
in a compulsory system and by PCLv <
D
1−xL in the voluntary system. (b) For the H − type,
there is no clear-cut result. We show a suﬃcient condition for the critical price to be higher in
a compulsory than in a voluntary system.
PCiv is defined by
piU(w0−αi−PCiv +xiPCiv )+(1−pi)U(w0−αi) = piU(w0−D)+(1−pi)U(w0) with αi = xipiPCiv (A)
Because PCLc =
D
1−xL ,
w0 − αi − PCLc + xiPCLc = w0 − αi −
µ
1− xi
1− xL
¶
D
w0 −
¡
xipiP
CL
c
¢
− PCLc + xiPCLc = w0 −
¡
xipiP
CL
c
¢
−
µ
1− xi
1− xL
¶
D (B)
(a) If xi = xL then
³
1−xi
1−xL
´
= 1
pLU(w0 − αL −D) < pLU(w0 −D) implies
pLU(w0 − αL −D) + (1− pL)U(w0) < pLU(w0 −D) + (1− pL)U(w0)
from (A),
pLU(w0 − αL −D) + (1− pL)U(w0) < pLU(w0 − αL − PCLv + xLPCLv ) + (1− pL)U(w0 − αL)
from (B),
pLU(w0 − αL − PCLc + xLPCLc ) + (1− pL)U(w0) < pLU(w0 − αL − PCLv + xLPCLv ) + (1− pL)U(w0 − αL)
⇔ pLU(w0 − αL − (1− xL)PCLc ) + (1− pL)U(w0) < pLU(w0 − αL − (1− xL)PCLv ) + (1− pL)U(w0 − αL)
implying PCLc > P
CL
v
(b) If xi = xH and x∗H = 1, from (B)
w0 −
¡
x∗HpHP
CL
c
¢
− PCLc + x∗HPCLc = w0 − pHPCLc
Since PCLc = P
CH
c in a compulsory private system and P
CL
c =
D
1−xL , we obtain
w0 −
¡
x∗HpHP
CL
c
¢
− PCLc + x∗HPCLc = w0 −
pH
1− xL
D
Then,
pHU(w0−
¡
x∗HpHP
CL
c
¢
−P cLc +x∗HPCLc )+(1−pH)U(w0) = pHU(w0−
pH
1− xL
D)+(1−pH)U(w0)
And, if pH1−xL > 1,
pHU(w0 − pH1−xLD) + (1− pH)U(w0) < pHU(w0 −D) + (1− pH)U(w0)
⇔ pHU(w0 −
¡
x∗HpHP
CL
c
¢
− PCLc + x∗HPCLc ) + (1− pH)U(w0) < pHU(w0 −D) + (1− pH)U(w0)
from (A), pHU(w0 − α∗H − (1− x∗H)PCHv ) + (1− pH)U(w0 − α∗H) = pHU(w0 −D) + (1− pH)U(w0)
⇒ pHU(w0 −
¡
x∗HpHP
CL
c
¢
− PCLc + x∗HPCLc ) + (1− pH)U(w0)
< pHU(w0 − α∗H − (1− x∗H)PCHv ) + (1− pH)U(w0 − α∗H)
⇒ pHU(w0 −
¡
x∗HpHP
CL
c
¢
− (1− x∗H)PCLc ) + (1− pH)U(w0)
< pHU(w0 − α∗H − (1− x∗H)PCHv ) + (1− pH)U(w0)
Because α∗H = x
∗
HpHP
CH
c , we must have P
CH
c > P
CH
v if
pH
1−xL > 1.¥
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